The mechanisms underlying the fear system serve an adaptive function, allowing individuals to rapidly detect threat in the environment and mount an appropriate response (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Öhman, 2005) . However, hypervigilant processing of threat -a heightened tendency to direct attention preferentially to threatening stimuli -is often found in anxious individuals (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mathews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992) . This attention bias to threat has been found in both clinically and non-clinically anxious individuals in a wide variety of tasks, and may be involved in both the development and maintenance of anxiety symptoms (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) .
There is, however, evidence to suggest that stressful circumstances alter anxious individuals' pattern of attention to threat. Bar-Haim et al. (2010) , for example, found that anxious individuals under acute threat displayed attentional avoidance as measured with the dot-probe task, rather than a bias towards threat. In addition, Shechner, Pelc, Pine, Fox, and Bar-Haim (2012) reported on the plasticity of attentional bias as a function of context. Individuals who previously received shock in one context displayed avoidance using the dot probe compared to others who had not previously received the shock. Emotional context, thus, appears to influence the manner in which threat is detected and responded to.
Two paradigms commonly used to evaluate the effects of threatening stimuli on attention are the dot-probe task and face-in-the crowd task. In the dot-probe task, participants are instructed to press a button indicating the location of a target, which appears in a location previously occupied by one of two faces. One of these faces typically expresses a neutral emotion and the other, a negative emotion, such as anger. Studies using the dot-probe paradigm have noted the presence of an attention bias to threat in individuals with anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) . Specifically, increased anxiety is associated with an enhanced bias or vigilance to detect targets that appear in the same location as threatening faces (angry faces) or words compared to nonthreatening faces (happy or neutral) compared to non-anxious participants (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & Przeworski, 2003; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004) . The "face-in-the crowd" paradigm, a type of visual search task, requires participants to identify faces amidst distractors (e.g. an angry face among an array of happy faces). In this task, individuals with social anxiety are also quicker during search to detect threatening faces amongst other distracting stimuli compared to happy or neutral faces (Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999; GilboaSchechtman, Presburger, Marom, & Hermesh, 2005; Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001) .
These studies generally examine group differences in attention mechanisms involved in emotion processing. However, a second line of work has focused on the impact emotion priming may have on subsequent attention. Several studies have demonstrated that early visual processes are affected by emotion primes, fearful primes in particular, and these effects are lasting. Neural evidence from steady state visual evoked potentials (ssVEP), thought to originate in early visual cortical regions, has demonstrated that a fearful cue facilitates identification of threat (Wieser & Keil, 2014) . When a scene containing threat is preceded by a fearful face expression, ssVEP's to the threat scene increase, compared to other scenes (Wieser & Keil, 2014) . Phelps, Ling, and Carrasco (2006) also demonstrated that fearful expressions have the capability of altering early vision, specifically, contrast sensitivity. Compared to trials preceded by neutral faces, trials preceded by fearful faces lowered the contrast sensitivity threshold necessary detect the orientation of the subsequent target Gabor stimuli. The observed advantage for trials preceded by a fearful face in early visual processing, was particularly pronounced for the condition in which the emotion cues appeared in a single peripheral location, as opposed to distributed in each of the four possible target locations (Phelps et al., 2006) . In a subsequent study, Ferneyhough, Kim, Phelps, and Carrasco (2013) replicated the findings of Phelps et al. (2006) in subjects who reported low trait anxiety characteristics. However, subjects who reported high trait anxiety characteristics displayed compromised contrast sensitivity on trials where a peripheral fearful face was followed by a display in which the target Gabor patch was in a different location from the original prime. The attentional cost of diverting attention away from the fearful cue in order detect the orientation of the target Gabor, proved costly for the visual perception of individuals who scored highest on trait anxiety (Ferneyhough et al., 2013) .
In another priming study utilising the dot-probe task, Helfinstein, White, Bar-Haim, and Fox (2008) studied adults selected for high and low self-reported social anxiety symptoms, priming them with words either conveying relevant affective meaning (e.g. shy, embarrassed) or neutral words, before each trial on the dot probe task. They found that when subjects with high reported social anxiety symptoms were primed with affective words, they did not display a bias towards threat, however, they displayed a threat bias after being priming with neutral words. Conversely, when subjects with low reported social anxiety symptoms were primed with affective words, they showed an attention bias to threat that was not present when primed with neutral words. Thus, emotion priming appears to differentially impact subsequent attention processes as a function of anxiety symptoms in sub-clinical samples.
A number of studies have also found that emotion priming facilitates visual search for targets embedded in an array of distractors. For example, Becker (2009) found that when individuals are primed with fearful expressions prior to completing a non-valenced visual search task (e.g. looking for a picture of a house amid other common stimuli such as planes and cars), search performance improves. The improvement relative to neutral face-primed performance becomes more pronounced as the number of distracting stimuli increases in search arrays (see also Olatunji, Ciesielski, Armstrong, & Zald, 2011 with consistent findings). In the classic visual search literature, adding distractors to search arrays results in increases in reaction times or search slopes (Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2008) . Seeing a fearful face results in a flattening of search slopes, or faster target detection than would be expected in the absence of the fearful face prime. In an oddball visual detection utilising the same variations in number of distractor stimuli as Becker (2009), Quinlan and Johnson (2011) found that participants are fastest to detect threatening stimuli compared to non-threatening stimuli when trials are repeatedly preceded by a fearful cue compared to being repeatedly preceded by a neutral cue.
The findings of these priming studies can be interpreted in the context of a two-step threat detection model: first, attention is engaged by threat-cueing stimuli, quickly followed by a second stage in which there is increased capacity for rapid orienting and perception of other stimuli (Becker, 2009 ). In line with this model, Becker (2009) suggested that fearful facial expressions, and other threat-cueing stimuli, might modulate attentional orientating by reallocating attention faster to scanning the environment in search of immediate threat. Indeed, differences in vigilance have been suggested as contributing to patterns of anxiety. While there are costs in early visual processing for high trait anxious individuals reported by Ferneyhough et al. (2013) when primed with fearful cues, visual search performance, is not clearly facilitated or hindered by fearful cues as a function of higher trait anxiety (Olatunji et al., 2011) . Olatunji et al. (2011 ) replicated Becker's (2009 findings that fearful primes facilitate more efficient visual search, however no such facilitation nor deterioration was observed for individuals who displayed higher characteristics of trait anxiety. It may be that task limitations, specifically lack of a variety of set sizes (each visual search array contained 12 items), restricted the ability to detect clear individual differences in priming effects as a function of anxiety symptoms. In a follow-up study examining a group of veterans high in post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, and a control group, Olatunji, Armstrong, Bilsky, and Zhao (2015) found no differences in visual search performance between the PTSD and control groups when subjects were primed with fearful faces, however, the high PTSD group was significantly slower to detect the target during the moderately difficult visual search array when primed with an angry prime, as compared to the control group. While cue impact may vary by anxiety symptomology, it appears that threat-related cues across a variety of anxiety measures and priming tasks, have the capability to have costly effects on visual search.
To add to the current literature examining priming effects on attention across the anxiety continuum, we examined the impact of priming on attention as a function of anxiety by designing a task in which emotional faces were used as primes for a visual search task. Of specific interest was examining how performance on this new task might vary as a function of social anxiety characteristics, thus expanding our understanding of attention in the context of threat. Several studies have demonstrated reaction time and attentional performance differences on emotion cueing visual attention tasks as a function of sub-clinical levels of anxiety (Ferneyhough et al., 2013; Fox, Henderson, Rubin, Calkins, & Schmidt, 2001; Helfinstein et al., 2008; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2006; Macleod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008; Olatunji et al., 2011) . In the initial examination of the paradigm used for the current study, we chose to examine social anxiety characteristics within a subclinical population, as this type of anxiety may be the most sensitive to priming effects of facial expressions. Our novel search task may allow greater insight into the specific attention components that influence emotional processing in anxious individuals. That is, while the dot-probe task has captured patterns of attention bias in anxiety, it is not clear if the reaction time measures reflect initial orienting to threat, difficulty disengaging form threat, or a general vigilance to threat cues in the environment (Weierich et al., 2008 ). Because the current task includes a condition comparable to the dot-probe task, as well as several visual search set sizes, this task allows us to disambiguate these processes by separating emotion exposure from the visual search task. None of the aforementioned visual search priming tasks included such a condition. Moreover, Olatunji et al. (2011) and Olatunji et al. (2015) , presented the priming cue immediately prior to each visual search, with no time to allow for the extinguishing of attention capture, or disengagement effects. The current study follows the timing of Becker's (2009) and Quinlan and Johnson's (2011) tasks, which both include 600 milliseconds interstimulus intervals (ISI) between the priming cue and search arrays. Without both a set-size comparable to the dot-probe paradigm, as well as in ISI to extinguish attention capturing/disengagement effects, it is impossible to discern whether differential visual performance is due to the emotion prime directly impacting attentional orienting, or simply measuring the amount of time it takes the participant to disengage from the emotion prime.
In this study, participants were primed with five facial emotion expressions (angry, fear, happy, neutral, and surprised) and one scrambled face immediately prior to every visual search trial, as reaction times to identify each target was recorded. Two baseline comparison conditions were included: neutral faces and scrambled faces. We included the surprised emotion as research indicates that high socially anxious individuals interpret surprised faces as threatening (Kim et al., 2004; Richards et al., 2002) . This may be due to perceptual similarities between surprised and fearful facial expressions (raised eyebrows, wide eyes, and open mouth), as well as the ambiguity of a surprised expression. Indeed, studies that have investigated the valence interpretation of surprised faces have shown that they are not consistently rated as either positive or negative, and are dually valenced and ambiguous (Neta, Davis, & Whalen, 2011) .
Angry was included as this emotion has been used commonly in dot-probe paradigms as the "threatening" emotion, and demonstrated differences in reaction time performance on these visual attention tasks as a function of differences in anxiety levels (MacLeod et al., 1986; Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg et al., 1992) . While angry faces and fearful faces both signal threat, fearful faces indicate ambiguity, such that the location of threat is not known. We included the fearful face in efforts to replicate similar findings by Becker (2009), Phelps et al. (2006) , and Ferneyhough et al. (2013) , who each found that when primed with fearful facial expressions, visual attention improved (visual search improvement: Becker, 2009 ; low level contrast sensitivity improvements: Phelps et al., 2006; and Ferneyhough et al., 2013) . Moreover, Ferneyhough et al. (2013) found that individuals with high trait anxiety experienced deterioration in contrast sensitivity when primed with fearful faces, while low trait anxious individuals experienced enhanced contrast-sensitivity.
A concern for a number of the tasks previously mentioned, including the dot-probe, face in the crowd, visual search, and contrast sensitivity tasks, is the use of neutral faces for the comparison or control condition. The logic behind using a neutral face is that a neutral face contains all of the perceptual features, as other emotions, but do not convey valence. However, there have been discrepant findings with respect to how neutral faces modulate visual attention as a function of anxiety (Cooney, Atlas, Joormann, Eugène, & Gotlib, 2006; Ferneyhough et al., 2013) . Cooney et al. (2006) found that individuals with social anxiety displayed a negative interpretation bias towards neutral faces, and displayed heightened patterns of amygdala activation to neutral faces compared to a control group (Cooney et al., 2006) . Neutral faces may not be an ideal control condition to examine the effects of emotions on visual attention when studying anxious individuals. To address this concern, we included a scrambled face as a control. A scrambled face stimuli contains all the components of a face, however do not allow the participant to perceive an actual face or any type of emotion, making it a potentially better comparison condition or baseline than the commonly used neutral face.
In addition, by manipulating the processing load via the distractor presence we can better capture the impact of emotion on attention functions. While Becker (2009 ), Olatunji, Armstrong, McHugo, & Zald, 2013 , and Quinlan and Johnson (2011 utilised a variety of set sizes, these set sizes did not exceed 12 items, limiting the interpretability of how visual search efficiency changes as a function of increasing demands in various emotional contexts. Moreover, Olatunji et al. (2011) and Olatunji et al. (2015) utilised reaction time for the participant to navigate his or her mouse cursor to the target location on the screen as the dependent measure of visual search latency, limiting the specificity and sensitivity of the results of actual subject latency to detect the target location. Therefore, we varied the number of distractors used for visual search, ranging from no distractors, up to 29 distractors. As the number of distractors increase, an individual must sample more possible target locations, leading to longer target detection times. If threatening emotional contexts differentially affect attentional orienting processes in socially anxious individuals, there should be differences in the slope of the visual search as a function of the emotion prime and social anxiety (Treisman, 1986) . Slope refers to the reaction time cost to detect the target as a function of increasing the number of distractors (Treisman, 1986) . We predicted that similar to the findings reported by Olatunji et al. (2011 ), Olatunji et al. (2015 , Quinlan and Johnson (2011), Phelps et al. (2006) , Ferneyhough et al. (2013) , and Becker (2009) , that for participants in the normal or low range of reported in social anxiety symptoms, being primed with threat-relevant cues would facilitate visual search performance (e.g. smaller slope, indicating reduced reaction time costs when more distractors are added). Based on the literature demonstrating deterioration in visual attention across a variety of attentional tasks and anxiety dimensions (Amir et al., 2003; Ferneyhough et al., 2013; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999 , 2005 Helfinstein et al., 2008; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg et al., 2004; Ohman et al., 2001; Olatunji et al., 2011 Olatunji et al., , 2015 , we predicted that for participants scoring higher on social anxiety measures, threatening faces would degrade visual search performance (e.g. larger slope, indicating increased reaction time costs when more distractors are added). The major aims of this study were to further clarify whether previous findings of costly visual attentional control when primed with threatening images reflect initial alerting or attention capture, examine which emotional contexts affect attention similarly to reported threatening emotional contexts, as well as examine whether these emotional contexts additionally affect later visual attentional processes, specifically attentional orienting during a visual search.
Methods

Participants
Participants were recruited based on their self-report answer on the Liebowitz Scale of Social Anxiety (LSAS) (Heimberg et al., 1999) through an online survey system. Participants received psychology course credit and agreed to be contacted for future studies based on their scores. From the 776 students that completed the LSAS, mean LSAS score was calculated, and participants were recruited based on ±1 standard deviation from the mean (M LSAS = 45). Participants who scored below 22, or above 68 on the LSAS were invited to participate in the study. To achieve ample sample size, the study was opened up to all University of Maryland students enrolled in Introduction to Psychology, and an additional unselected 11 subjects who had not completed any part of the survey participated. For these subjects, the LSAS administered at the time of testing.
A power analysis conducted in G*Power 3.1 estimated that 85 participants were needed to achieve a power of .95 (a moderate effect size, based upon previous studies with d = .5) when carrying out a 2-group, 6 within-subjects conditions Linear Mixed Model (LMM). The final sample included 77 adults (24 males) between the ages of 18 and 34 (M = 21.62, SD = 3.16). Self-reported race was as follows: 62% Caucasian, 21% Asian, 8% African American, 5% Hispanic and 4% of participants chose not to answer. Three participants who did not complete the entire visual search task were excluded from all further analyses, resulting in a final sample of 74 participants (22 males). The University Institution Review Board approved all procedures and participants of the study received verbal and written informed consent in accordance with these procedures.
Questionnaires
The LSAS was administered on-line and again when subjects came to the lab for the study. The mean elapsed time of completion of LSAS between time 1 (pre-selection of the participants) and time 2 (the actual study) was M = 39.6 days, SD = 18.28 days, and ranged from 3 to 72 days. LSAS scores obtained through the online survey system and during the laboratory visit were highly correlated r (66) = .79, p < .001. The State portion of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1977) was also obtained at the time of testing for use in analyses to control for state anxiety at the time of the study (see Table 1 ). The State Trait Anxiety inventory was only administered during the laboratory visit, not the online survey utilised for screen purposes. The laboratory collected LSAS scores of the entire sample (n = 77), did not violate normality tests, and fit a normal distribution rather than a bimodal distribution (even though we did initially attempt to select to acquire extreme groups) (see Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2 ).
Face stimuli 80 pictures of facial expressions were selected from the NimStim Inventory (Tottenham et al., 2009 ). The selection of NimStim faces used for this paradigm was based on the following criterion: NimStim faces that had comparable luminance, no visible jewellery, comparable face size, comparable head tilt angle, minimal hair on face/facial hair, and included a variety of races. The pictures depicting the emotional faces were all presented at a size of 2 by 3 in. and centered on the computer screen so that the nose of the stimulus replaced the previously presented crosshair. All faces were grey scaled, and cropped to fit with in a 2 by 3 in. oval, thus controlling for variations in colour (Blau, Naurer, Tottenham, & McCandliss, 2007) (see Figure 1(a) ). The racial breakdown of the faces for males included: two black, one Hispanic, and five white faces. For female faces: two black, one Hispanic, one Asian, and four white faces. The selected NimStim actor numbers were as follows: f03, f05, f06, f07, f09, f11, f13, f18, m23, m24, m26, m27, m34, m37, m41, m42. These included five pictures of eight female actors with angry, fearful, happy, neutral, and surprised expressions and five pictures of eight male actors expressing the same emotions (see Figure 2 (a)). The scrambled face used, designed by Katoni (2012) , was a picture of a female actor presenting a neutral face, divided into various small squares and changing the position of each square so that the face appeared scrambled (see Figure 2(a) ). Moreover, these faces never overlapped with the locations of any of the visual search targets -this was to insure that no target location was inhibited or primed by prior visual stimuli.
Visual search stimuli
In the conjunction visual search paradigm, participants were asked to find a black slanted bar amongst a set of distractors. The distractors included white vertical bars, white slanted bars, and black vertical bars. Set size varied between 1 (the target black diagonal bar), 5, 15, and 30 items. The position of the black diagonal bar varied between eight different positions of a radius of 4 in. from the black crosshair that remained at the centre of the screen during the visual search paradigm. The black diagonal bar could appear at 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°, 225°, 270°, and 315°along this radius. Each visual search display was displayed twice for each of the 5 emotion conditions; one full set for the 8 female actors, and one full set for the 8 male actors, as well as twice for the scrambled face condition. This resulted in 64 trials for each of the 6 conditions. X and Y coordinates of every distractor item in each visual search were randomly assigned using randomizer.org (see Figure 2(b) ).
In addition to these trials, there were 24 catch trials in which there was no actual target present, and participants were told to do nothing (as opposed to pressing the spacebar). These catch trials were inserted randomly as an attention check to make sure that participants were appropriately completing the task. Catch trials consisted of 8 trials with 5 distractors, 8 trials with 15 distractors, and 8 trials with 30 distractors. Participants completed a total of 528 visual search trials.
Visual search task
The task was presented using E-Prime 2.0 stimulus presentation software on a Dell laptop with an attached 1080 × 1024 resolution monitor and keyboard. Each trial consisted of a face stimulus presented for 300 milliseconds, followed by a black crosshair centred on a gray background for 600 milliseconds. The visual search task was then presented for 2000 milliseconds, or until the participant responded by pressing the space bar. The trial ended with another black fixation on a gray background presented for 500 milliseconds (see Figure 1(c) ). The timing of the presentation was modelled after Becker (2009). Participants were instructed to press the spacebar as soon as they identified a black slanted target, or let the trial pass by if they did not detect a black slanted bar. Participants were not given any a priori information regarding the face primes in an effort to prevent biasing attention towards the faces. Participants completed 20 practice trials.
E-prime software created a random order of trials per each participant so that no two participants saw the same presentation of trials. To avoid the same emotion showing up several times successively, which could lead to habituation (Blau et al., 2007) , the task cycled through each of the 6 priming conditions in a random order, before repeating any of the 6 priming conditions. Within each priming condition, and within each of the 4 set sizes, the 16 faces were randomly presented before each visual search to insure the same face did not show up more than once per set size. For each of the 24 catch trials, one of the 16 faces were randomly selected to prime each catch array.
Order of presentation of the visual search arrays was completely randomised within each priming condition. The total time to complete the visual search task was approximately 20 minutes. Reaction time data were recorded by E-prime software and measured the length of time from the beginning of the visual search presentation until the participant detected the target indicated by pressing the space bar. Catch trials in which there was no real target and participants did not respond (after determining the absence of the target) were used to verify participants' attention and understanding of the task. For catch trials, correct responses or omissions were scored with a 1 and errors were tagged with a 0 value. Participants who scored below 90% accuracy for catch trial response were excluded from further analyses (N = 4, M = 65%, SD = 36%).
Reaction time data were summarised and mean RT data (per emotion and set size) were calculated per participant. For each participant's data, trials with reaction times ±2 standard deviations from the participants' mean reaction time were not included in analysis of each participant's RT. After removing missed trials and outliers, the percentage of usable trials was calculated for each participant. Participants with less than 90% of usable trials were excluded from further analysis. No further participants were excluded based on these criteria. The final sample analysed consisted of 70 of the 74 participants who completed the entire visual search task (M LSAS = 53.39, SD LSAS = 29.07).
Results
To confirm that the four set size conditions were sufficient to detect the effects of increasing demands selective measures of attention, as measured by reaction time (Treisman, 1986) , we ran a LMM with set size type as a fixed-effect (no distractors, 4 distractors, 14 distractors, 29 distractors) and participant as a random effect 1 . A LMM approach was utilised to incorporate individual differences and experimental manipulations into the analyses. A LMM is a more robust model compared to repeated-measures analyses of variance (rmANOVA), and among other advantages, accounts for random effects due to participants. For in-depth explanation and application in visual attention research, see Kliegl, Wei, Dambacher, Yan, and Zhou (2011), Kliegl, Masson, and Richter (2010) , and Mathôt, van der Linden, Grainger, and Vitu (2013) . This analysis revealed the expected main effect of set size, F(3, 1035) = 586.52, p < .001, with reaction times increasing with increasing number of distractors.
Next, to determine whether the 600 milliseconds ITI between the face prime and the visual search was enough time to extinguish any residual effects of disengagement (see Becker, 2009 ) we computed a LMM 1 . Our dependent measure was RT during set size 1, participant was our random effect, with emotion (surprised, angry, fear, happy, neutral, scrambled) × Social Anxiety, and covariates State Anxiety and Sex as fixed effects. There were no main effects, or interactions, indicating that attention did not differ as a function of condition F(5, 87.06) = 1.12, p = .36, social anxiety F(1, 65.71) = .13, p = .73, state anxiety F(1, 65.71) = .77, p = .38, sex F(1, 65.58) = 3.1, p = .08. The lack of reaction time differences indicated that baseline reaction time did not differ as a function of Social or State Anxiety. All further analyses were conducted on the slope of each individual's visual search function (Weierich et al., 2008) .
Slope calculations
A single slope value was calculated per participant and per emotion priming condition. Slopes were calculated as change in reaction time for target detection as a function of change in number of items in each of the set sizes. Each participant's reaction time data for each emotion priming condition expression was fitted to linear slopes, using reaction time to detect the target during set size 1 as the intercept. The average R 2 value for visual search functions of the across the sample was (M = 0.81, SD = 0.09).
Anxiety scale and model selection
To test whether emotions differentially affected visual search efficiency (slope) as a function of social anxiety, a LMM 1 was computed using slope as the dependent measure, participant as a random effect, and emotion (surprised, angry, fear, happy, neutral, scrambled) × Social Anxiety 2 and covariates State Anxiety and Sex as fixed effects. The Scrambled Slope was the reference or "baseline" condition in the model 3 . In the LMM, a reference for each categorical variable is utilised to examine differences between the reference (one level of the categorical variable) and other levels of the categorical variable. In our particular model, the selected reference condition was the scrambled condition, so that our estimated fixedeffects were comparing each emotion condition to the scrambled condition. As mentioned in the introduction, we chose to use a scrambled face was used as our reference condition/ baseline comparison because a scrambled face stimuli contains all the components of a face, however they do not allow the participant to perceive an actual face or any type of emotion, making it a potentially better comparison condition or baseline than the commonly used neutral face. There was no main effect of LSAS score F(1, 65.387) = .84, p = .36, or State Anxiety F(1, 65.38) = 1.00, p = .32 and there were trend effects for sex F(1, 64.92) = 3.83, p = .055, and emotion F(5, 90.79) = 1.88, p = .1.
There were two significant two-way interactions: Emotion by Social Anxiety F(5, 90.79) = 2.61, p < . and Table 3 ). Visual search performance did not significantly differ after happy t(105.41) = 1.49, p = .14, d = .29, or neutral t(87.46) = .98, p = .33, d = .21, primes, as a function of social anxiety score.
To examine the generalisability of whether the facial expressions functioned as threatening or nonthreatening, we additionally examined grouping threatening emotions together, and non-threatening emotions together. Fearful, and Angry emotions functioned similarly in our original model, and have been commonly used in emotion priming tasks, we grouped those together to create an average "threat" prime condition. Because Happy and functioned similarly we grouped those together to create an average "no threat" prime condition. Another LMM 1 was computed using slope as the dependent measure, participant as a random effect, and emotion category (threatening, non-threatening, and scrambled) × Social Anxiety × State Anxiety as fixed effects. As in the previous model, scrambled condition was the reference or "baseline" condition in the model. There was no main effect of LSAS score F(1, 75.39) = .173, p = .68, or State Anxiety F(1, 75.39) = .001, p = .98 and there was a main effect of Emotion type F(2, 141.83) = 5.02, p < .01. There were two significant two-way interactions: Emotion by Social Anxiety F(2, 141.83) = 6.12, p < .01, and Emotion by State Anxiety F(2, 141.83) = 9.24, p < .001.
Estimates of fixed-effects indicated that as State Anxiety increased, both threatening primes (t(139.97) = −4.30, p < .001 d = −.73), and non-threatening primes (t(122.23) = −2.91, p < .01 d = −.53) facilitated more efficient visual search compared to being primed with a scrambled face. Conversely, estimates of fixed effects indicated that as Social Anxiety, as measured by LSAS score, increased, only threatening degraded visual search efficiency compared to being primed with a scrambled face (t (139.97) = −4.30, p < .001 d = .56). Visual search efficiency did not differ as a function of LSAS score when primed with non-threatening primes as compared to being primed with a scrambled face (t (122.23) = 1.46, p = .15, d = .26) (Figure 4 ).
Discussion
The current study aimed to build on the extant literature, which has reported difficulties in disengagement from threat in socially anxious individuals. The visual search design used in this study successfully differentiated between an initial alerting attentional bias, or attention capture towards threatening information, and effects on attentional orienting systems employed during visual search (Amir et al., 2003; Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002; Heeren, Lievens, & Philippot, 2011) . Specifically, the effects of emotion priming on performance this standard visual search task emerged as function of selfreported social anxiety symptoms, and demonstrated that individuals who report higher social anxiety, displayed degraded visual search performance when primed with surprise, angry and fearful faces, or more generally, threatening faces, as compared to neutral and scrambled faces. Conversely, participants who are on the lower end of the social anxiety continuum displayed a different and opposite pattern: face primes that indicated threat or ambiguity facilitated visual search. Results from low socially anxious participants are consistent with previous results with similar visual search tasks (Becker, 2009; Ferneyhough et al., 2013; Helfinstein et al., 2008; Olatunji et al., 2011 Olatunji et al., , 2015 Phelps et al., 2006; Quinlan & Johnson, 2011; Wieser & Keil, 2014) . In all instances, for individuals who are higher on the anxiety continuum, priming with negative emotion stimuli decreased either attention bias or search efficiency.
There are a number of possible explanations for the priming effects found in the current study. It is possible that priming with negative emotions increased task difficulty in high anxious individuals. The efficiency of visual search may be attenuated in anxious individuals due to increased effort expended to process negative emotional stimuli. Alternatively, or perhaps as well, the initial threat primes may serve as a distractor, suppressing attention even if task demands are not increased. However, the lack of effect in the set size 1 baseline condition, suggests that this may not be the case. If attention was alerted to, and maintained on threatening expressions, delayed disengagement from the emotion prime would have resulted in systematic delays of initiation and orienting of visual search, regardless of visual search difficulty. In addition to examining the set size 1 baseline condition in isolation across anxiety and emotion conditions, when baseline reaction time for each emotion type was controlled for (using set size 1 as the intercept in each slope calculation), visual search efficiency differences emerged as a function of both social anxiety levels and threatrelated prime conditions. Importantly, these results indicate that variations in social anxiety symptoms and how visual attention is distributed in response to threat emerged as a function of increasing demands on visual attention. State anxiety did not moderate the link between social anxiety symptoms and visual search performance, indicating that while transient anxiety, or general arousal also significantly and independently affects visual search efficiency, measures of stable social anxiety affect visual search efficiency independently and in addition to variable states of arousal.
It may be that in anxious individuals, negative emotion primes specifically affect the attention resource allocation system (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Helfinstein et al., 2008) , utilising finite resources and thus degrading the subject's ability for subsequent search. Finally, it is possible that priming with negative emotion stimuli may create more general processing interference, which would be evident in non-attention-based tasks. Subsequent studies will be needed to carefully compare potential mechanisms.
The findings regarding priming with surprise facial expressions suggest that surprised faces have a similar impact on visual search, to fearful faces in both high and low socially anxious individuals. These findings are consistent with previous research indicating that surprise expressions are not consistently rated as either positive or negative, rather are dually valenced and ambiguous (Neta et al., 2011) , as well as research indicating that high socially anxious individuals interpret surprised faces as threatening (Kim et al., 2004; Richards et al., 2002) .
Our paradigm was able to detect visual search efficiency differences as a function of anxiety and emotion, in contrast to other work (Olatunji et al., 2011 (Olatunji et al., , 2015 . However, there are several important limitations to the current study. First, while our reaction time measures were an improvement on previously used target detection measures (e.g. mouse cursor), it is likely that our reaction time measurements still underestimated the effects observed during both tasks. Future work will employ eye tracking and ERP methods to gain better temporal sensitivity, as well as elucidate the neural underpinnings and time course of variable visual search performance. Secondly, the faces used in our study do not reflect the average interaction with faces that most individuals experience. Moreover, various types of anxiety symptoms may be differentially susceptible to a variety of threat-related contexts. For example, Olatunji et al., 2015 found that images of threatening scenarios affected visual attention more than facial expressions, when examining individuals with PTSD. Future iterations of this paradigm will examine various types of threat primes, in addition to using facial expressions. Lastly, while the questionnaires obtained during the session are regarded as reliable self-report measures, self-report measures always vary in accuracy.
While attention bias to threat has similarly been studied in children suffering from paediatric anxiety disorders, and in children with subclinical anxiety symptoms, these paradigms have not examined the efficiency of attention with various levels of clutter in the visual environment as the current paradigm does (Pine & Klein, 2008) . A child's everyday environment is full of social stimuli, and various extraneous visual and auditory stimuli. Thus, it is imperative to examine attentional processing streams in experimental contexts that attempt replicate attentional demands that individuals face in their typical environment. Moreover, because emotion processing skills and attentional biases develop at a young age, and as a function of experience, an understanding of early attentional biases existing in children with paediatric anxiety can provide methods of earlier identification of children at risk for paediatric anxiety, as well as the development of early intervention programmes (Pine & Klein, 2008) .
To address both the developmental trajectory of visual attention in this context, as well, as the clinical implications, several lines of work can be pursued. Examination of developmental trajectories of threatvigilance from middle childhood through late adolescence using this task, and consideration of how variations in sub clinical anxiety symptoms affects how these children perform on the present visual search task is currently ongoing. Additionally, we are examining how threat-vigilance may vary as a function of a clinical adolescent anxiety disorder, and utilising eye tracking methodologies to obtain more precise measures of visual attention during this task. To gain a deeper understanding of the neural signatures of visual attention and emotion processing during the task, electrophysiology measures including ERPs and EEG will be examined throughout the course of the task. The overarching goal of these studies is to formulate a more comprehensive and developmental theory of how anxiety interacts with various emotional contexts, and subsequently affects attentional processing.
Conclusions
This study builds upon previous literature examining attention in socially anxious individuals. Using a newly modified visual search task, we found that priming with specific facial emotions performance facilitated or degraded visual search performance as a function of level of social anxiety. The effect of emotion priming extended to the processing of non-affective perceptual stimuli, indicating that emotion faces impacted broad, context-independent processing mechanisms. The current findings suggest that the effortful allocation of attention is affected by social anxiety symptom severity: individuals who report higher social anxiety severity are differentially impacted by exposure to threat and/or ambiguity, such that their ability to subsequently search their environment in the presence of distracting information is degraded. This significant deterioration in visual search performance did not occur when primed with Happy or Neutral emotions, and was independent of the individuals' state anxiety or arousal at the time of test. This difficulty in "recovering" from threat exposure may diminish anxious individuals' ability to flexibly respond to environmental demands. This may be evident even in affect-neutral tasks. Over time, the negative consequences that accompany inflexibility may further reinforce their initial response to threat/ambiguity, contributing to the broad behaviour patterns typically observed in social anxiety: behavioural freezing, rigidity, and withdrawal. Notes 1. Each Linear Mixed Model was computed using SPSS 23.0, and utilised the diagonal covariance structure for the repeated fixed-effects, and identity covariance structure for the participant random effect. Each model was fitted using the restricted maximum likelihood (REML) criterion. The model was estimated using alternative covariance structures, and while the autoregressive and factor analytic structures also converged, inferences remained the same for other structures with little or no differences in model fit. The final model fit using the diagonal covariance structure for the repeated effect, as measured by Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC), was 1523.74, and for Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion (BIC), 1551.70. 2. The same model was run using a median split of LSAS scores group analysis and yielded the same results. 3. The same model was run using the Neutral Slope condition as the reference, and yielded the same results
